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The dynamics of infectious diseases have been modelled by several universally recognised 
procedures. The most common two modelling methods are differential equation models (DEM) and 
agent based models (ABM). These models have both been used through the late 20th and early 21st 
century to gain an understanding of prevalence levels and behaviour of infectious diseases; and 
subsequently to forecast potential impacts of a treatment. In the case of a life-threatening disease 
such as Malaria, it is problematic to be working with incorrect predictions and an epidemic may 
result from a misinformed judgement on the required treatment program. 
DEM and ABM have been documented to provide juxtapositioned results (and conclusions) in 
several cases, even whilst fitting identical data sets [Figueredo, et al. 2014]. Under the correct 
model, one would expect a fair representation of an infectious disease and hence an insightful 
conclusion. It is hence detrimental for the choice of treatment tactics to be dependent on the choice 
of model structure. This honours thesis has identified the necessity for caution on the model 
methodology and performs a sensitivity analysis on the incidence and prevalence of an infectious 
disease under varying levels of treatment. 
This thesis hones in on modelling methodology under various structures: the procedure is applicable 
to any infectious disease, and this thesis provides a case study on Malaria modelling with a later 
extension into Ebola. Beginning with a simple Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible (SIRS) 
model: immediately obvious differences are examined to give an indication of the point at which the 
models lose integrity in direct comparability. The SIRS models are built up to include varying levels of 
exposure, treatment and movement dynamics and examining the nature of the differences in 
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The introductory section conveys the use of mathematical modelling: Agent-based and differential 
equation based models within epidemiology. The basic characteristics of the diseases to be 
simulated by the models are described, and the purpose of modelling them is explained. 
Mathematical Modelling 
Mathematical modelling is the representation of a system whilst under a set of pre-specified 
conditions. A practical application of this is an epidemiological model which allows for stochastic 
behaviour where one can portray a set of possible time-dependant events through a vector of 
associated probabilities. Specifically, a model of an infectious disease must be able to represent the 
possibility of both an epidemic and the dormancy or extinction of a disease based on parameter 
choice. Thus, any event known to be able to occur in the system should be represented in the model 
with a non-zero probability. This dissertation will specifically look at a comparison of two 
mathematical modelling techniques in epidemiology: i.e. agent-based (AB) and differential equation 
(DE) models; with a case study on the infectious disease Malaria, and extension into Ebola.  
Malaria 
Malaria is commonly found in more humid environments, in the presence of Anopheles mosquitos 
the carriers of Plasmodium (malaria parasites) [Stassen. 2008]. If a carrying Anopheles female bites a 
human, plasmodium may be transferred which then mature in the liver for 1-2 weeks before 
entering the bloodstream, upon which they multiply via infection and rupture of red blood cells. 
Early signs of malaria similar to those of a common cold (general discomfort, irregular temperatures 
and sweats etc.) will be seen in the initial phase of the parasite acquisition. During this period the 
multiplication rates of the plasmodium are low, indicating that the basic Malaria model should be of 
an SEIR or SEIRS form (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible) [Koella and Antia. 
2003]. Once past the initial exposed stage, if an infected person remains untreated with the parasite 
in the bloodstream, plasmodium effectively prevents blood flow to vital organs, the failure of any of 
which is fatal.  
Malaria is not a communicable diseases; it cannot be transmittable directly between two people but 
is instead transmitted through vectors- the Anopheles mosquitos [Stassen. 2008]. Relying on a 
mosquito to acquire the disease from an infected human, and then transmit to an uninfected 
human. A simplified model will make assumptions about infection through surveyed mosquito 
densities and a more advanced model will attempt to model the mosquito population.  
Ebola 
Unlike instances of Malaria which are treatable, Ebola has no confirmed cure, yet advances in the 
treatment have been exponentially increasing over end of 2014 [Davis, 2014]. There is an associated 
death rate of 25-90 percent of cases. The outbreak of 2014 has tallied a higher infection count and 
death count since the first recorded epidemic in 1976 [WHO {2}, 2014]. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) High Level Meeting of 23 October 2014 has established the 
necessity of mass intervention [WHO {3}. 2014]. Due to research into the vaccination possibilities, 
there is production possibility at 24,000 units, with the intention to be increased to 230,000 by April 
2015. There is currently no availability of an FDA- approved vaccination [Davis, 2014], yet protocol 
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for testing has been reduced to randomised clinical control trials. Rather than verifying safety of the 
vaccination, the WHO intends an implementation in advance of knowledge of the side-effects [WHO 
{3}. 2014].  
 
Proposition: The Necessity of this Analysis 
Infectious diseases are problematic within many populations due to the nature of a possible 
epidemic. The modelling of such diseases allows for estimations into rates of disease transfer and of 
the risk of an epidemic; as well as inference into the dynamics of a target population. Similarly, the 
models can allow predictions effectiveness of quarantine or vaccination policies. Often, 
implementation of policies is country-wide. This incorporates large costs, hence it necessary to 
implement the correct procedure the first time and not endure unnecessary costs. Additionally, a 
sub-optimal policy being implemented could directly result in more deaths.  
This thesis incorporates a background discussion on model structure; and focusses on a sensitivity 
analysis agent based and differential equation models in modelling abilities under the same 
structure. Lastly, equivalent adjustments to the critical parameters in the models are made to 
observe how they affect a difference in performance between an ABM and DEM. This dissertation 
takes an in-depth look at the barriers faced in the sensitivity of results and recommendations to 
model methodology. Koella and Antia [2003] concluded the necessity of “more detailed knowledge 
of the critical parameters”, the lack of knowledge of these parameters (and which distibutional 
properties to implement) is a potential cause for differences between the agent-based and the 
differential equation model results. Measurements of interest are incidence, prevalence, treatment 
levels, and progression of the disease. Models of progressive steps of complexity are measured: 
incorporating treatment and death states in later models in addition to S (susceptible); E (exposed); I 
(infected); R (recovered).  
 
Literature review  
 
The use of mathematical models in the field of epidemiology was first recorded in a proposed 
inoculation plan against smallpox by Daniel Bernoulli in 1760. This allowed for a depiction of the 
system through differential equations, including the first noted use of    the “basic reproduction 
number” as a function of the force of infection:              [Scherner and McLean. 2014]. The 
model was further extended to account for the force of infection with dependency of population 
demography by P.D. En’ko in 1873 [Dietz, et al. 1998]. 
Epidemiology modelling evolved into the Reed-Frost models of 1920 [Diekman. 1996]. The initial 
models are a simple extension of a Markov-chain into a chain-binomial model in ABM methodology. 
This allowed for time-dependant rates of movement between three states {susceptible, infected, 
recovered}. In a DEM this structure is seen in average rates or “flows” of transition from one state to 
another. Significant contributions to the flow between classes were brought in the early 1900s in the 
Kermack-McKendrick model [Kermack and McKendrick. 1927]. Subsequently, H. Soper introduced 
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into the Kermack-McKendrick SIR (Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered) model the possibility of 
death from the disease [Brauer. 1984] and the state-based models were designed to incorporate 
complexities of agent-based and stochastic transition between states.  
A significant modelling procedure was established by Ross in 1911 [Smith, D. et al. 2012] who 
incorporated into a basic malaria model the dynamics of a mosquito infection Markov-Chain. This 
model is dependent on the densities of both the human and the mosquito populations in the various 
states. Ross’s model was extended by the inclusion of a vector-incubation period (latency) period 
before infectiousness arose by Macdonald [1957]. Macdonald as also established the importance of 
the number of secondary infections (R0: see glossary p43) produced by an infected human, termed 
the “basic reproduction number”. An R0 greater than one predicts an epidemic to occur.  Spatial 
heterogeneity was introduced by Dye and Hasibeder [1986]. The Delayed-Ross-Macdonald model 
takes into consideration the latent period in more complicated forms [Ruan, et al. 2008]. This is easy 
to model in ABM methodology, but more complex in DEM, requiring segregation of the population 
into homogenous groups. 
Evolution and grouping of different types of SEIR malaria models. Subscripts 'h' and 'm' represent 




Significant work in the epidemiological model is depicted in a flow diagram above. The focus of this 
dissertation is attributed to the body of work from Ross [Mandal et al. 2011] and Macdonald [1957]. 
Anderson and May introduced age dependant rates of susceptibility, which was closely followed by a 
model from Torres-Sorando and Rodriguez incorporating human movement in 1991. This idea was 
extended to mosquito-population genetic models in work from Yang (in 2000), and Parham and 
Michael (in 2010) who explicitly model environmental and climate-dependant demography and 
movement of mosquitos. Detailed flows between states from Koella and Antia [2003] were added to 
an extended cohort model from Aron and May (designed in 1982) who had allowed the flow of 
“partially immune” individuals into the susceptible state. Filipe is regarded as the most recent insight 
(2007) into the human-side of the malaria virus, scrutinising the acquisition of immunity via 
mathematical modelling. He provides coverage of immunity as a function of historical infection, 
allowing a non-memoryless rate of transfer between states. Allowing for an account of death caused 
by a virus has typically been given minimum prioritisation, setting total death equal to total births 
and hence working with a constant population size. Ngwa and Shu incorporated the effect of an 
increased force of mortality due to the disease, further extended by Chisnis in 2006 to allow for 
population immigration in and out of the model [Mandal, et al. 2011]. 
Specific works in the field of this paper are the establishments of differences between the agent-
based models (ABM) and differential equation models (DEM). Both models have advantages, most 
significantly an ABM can readily capture heterogeneity amoungst a population, and DEM has a much 
faster computation time. It is potentially risky to use AB modelling if the dynamics of a population 
are in any way not well understood [Koella and Antia. 2003]. Rahmandad and Sterman [2008] 
expose discrepancy between the two models and begin a discussion of four parameters which are 
subject to heterogeneity: exposed contact rate; infectivity; emergence time and disease duration. 
This work was complimented by Bobashev et al. [2007] who discussed the danger of model structure 
causing a misrepresentation of a disease, and began discussion on a hybrid model. The theoretical 
discrepancies are proven by Sheetal et al. [2014] and in particular it is demonstrated that under 
treatment, a population’s treatment probability is not necessarily representative of the treatment 
coverage. Figueredo et al. [2014) established the preference of stochastic techniques in ABM over 
DEM, specifically in the field of cancer. This dissertation aims to establish the underlying causes of 
the variation of results based on model structure, looking at treatment, incidence, prevalence, 
steady-state probabilities and parameter sensitivity.  
The analysis in a comparison of ABM and DEM methodology in Model 3 of Malaria (later in paper) is 
readily applicable to a more fatal disease to which a mass-treatment policy can be applied. The Ebola 
virus disease (EVD) is also known as the Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever due to the haemorrhagic 
properties [Chan. 2014]. Analysis of the general properties of haemorrhagic virus properties has 
been performed by Lashley and Durham. The 2014 strain of Ebola is known as the Zaire ebolavirus 
strain [Blaize. 2014], the 5th recorded strain, first seen in 2013. Ebola is a rapid-acting virus, with an 
inoculation period of 2-21 days [Lashley and Durham. 2007] where it remains docile and non-
transmissible.  With the initial symptoms of a typical fever, cold or virus, EVD is transmittable from 
this point to those in contact with the either infected living individuals, or infected corpses, or 
infected wildlife. Transmission is possible through contact with bodily fluids, sinew or secretions.  A 
total of 13,567 cases of EVD have been reported, with 4,951 fatalities and rising as at 31 October 
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2014. With so many casualties, the Zaire ebolavirus is recorded as the most infectious and deadly 
epidemic of EVD [WHO {1}. 2014]. 
 
Epidemiological Methodology  
 
An introduction into epidemiological modelling: the modelling of health and sickness patterns 
over a population; and the two selected methods of modelling the dynamics: ABM and DEM. 
The mathematical methods of modelling epidemiological models form a description of the 
movement of the population through relevant phases of a disease. The modelling structure is the 
decision of which states to include in the model, which states communicates or allows one-
directional flows, and what the rate of these flows is set to.   
Simple Differential Equation Model of a system in States S; I; R 
 
 
The basic model of disease transition proceeds through the states S-I-R (Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered), depicted above. A simple model will assume a constant infections rate and recovery 
rate, often setting the population number as a controlled constant and allowing birth-rate to equal 
death rate [Rahmandad and Sterman. 2008]. For a lethal parasite, it is necessary to include a state-
dependant possibility of transition into death which will thus allow accounting for deaths caused by 
the disease by denoting a higher force of mortality in the infected state [Brauer. 1984].  
An Agent-based model operates in a very similar manner, allowing the same transitions to occur, but 
as opposed to a differential model which uses a rate of flow, multiplied by the proportion of 
individuals in state k as the flow from k: an ABM makes a binary decision per each individual in the 






DEM movement in state K at time t: 
  
  
           ̅     
Where ̅ is the state with a flow into K  
 
Above: K would be the infected state, with flow from S into infected as     and flow out of 
infected to recovered as   ) 
 
ABM movement in state K at time t: 
 ∑      }         }
                      
 
 ∑                      }
            }           
 
 
Above: K would also represent the infected state, and the change between the numbers of 
individuals in K between times [t-1 : t]; is the numbers of individuals who arrived in state K 
less those who left state K.  
 
 
Intermediate Differential Equation Model of a system in States S; E; I; R; D 
 
 
Another commonly used modelling procedure is to allow for stochastic movement. The advantage of 
this is to allow for more realistic behaviour and for the occurrence of extreme events. When setting 
individualized parameters to a population (i.e. in an agent-based model), the dynamics of the 
population will need to be looked at under a probability field. The nature of an agent-based model 
will require transition between states to be a function of the entire population, hence there is often 
an extensive computational time required. This is not typically an issue with differential equation 
models, as the average population dynamics are used throughout. A mixed model [Bobashev, et al. 
2007] will allow for the duel use of both modelling procedures; agent-based modelling for a start-up 
disease, until it has at least surpassed the threshold to be infectious to at least one other entity, 




In a brief summary model structure that are examined in this paper as both ABM and DEM: 
Model Stage States incorporated Additional assumptions 
Simple S-I-R-S  S-I-R-S 
Susceptible, Infected, 
Recovered, and revision to 
susceptible again once recovery 
has “worn off”. 
Assume deaths occur at same 
rate as births, and constant 
susceptibility to infections 
(dependant only on number of 
infective individuals in the 
system).  
Treatment Model  
Vaccination- Allow treatment 
of susceptible and of exposed 
and infected individuals at 
varying rates of success. 
 
Performed under several 
policies to observe impacts and 
look for differences between 
models. 
 
S-E-I-R-S, with a mirror class or 
each ST; ET; IT; RT for treated/ 
vaccinated individuals in the 
respective states. 
Analyses impact of treatment 
level on the population which 
contains disease.  
Treatment Model  
Mass Screen and Treat- mass 
drug administration 
S-E-I-R/D 
Allowing death state within the 
model. Also allowing transfer 
from S, E or I successfully 
treatment/ non-susceptible.  
Accounting for infectiousness 
of individuals at varying rates 
according to which infection 
state they are in, and 




Data and Measurements 
A discussion of the intention of the underlying models in general cases as well as how this paper 
has selected the model structure, and what the measurements are taken with the purpose of. 
 
Any Epidemiological model is designed to replicate the expected patterns of a disease. The 
“expected patterns” are not closed to be the average, but rather to represent the range of 
possibilities such that protocols can be designed to optimize the ability to deal with the disease; the 
exact dynamics of which are not known in advance. The best proxy for future dynamics are historical 
data and measurements; hence once a model has been designed for a disease, it can be verified and 
validated by seeing how the model can replicate incidences/ epidemics of the disease historically.  
Where data is fitted to the above S-I-R-S and extended models in other papers, the Least-Squares 
algorithm is applied to estimate parameter values. The application of this dissertation is aimed 
towards Southern African populations where Malaria is prolific; hence parameters in this thesis have 
been selected from reports of disease from such areas. ABM and DEM models are then constructed 
to mimic the disease history, and are compared against one another. The emphasis of this paper is 
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to extract differences between the modelling procedures, not necessarily specific to one population 
but how they would appear in a type of population and how to optimize the modelling procedure.   
All coding for this project has been completed using R version 3.1.0, a matrix oriented statistical 
language. The modelling of differential equations has been performed in discrete-time, and hence is 
represented Difference Equations, which are coded entirely by the author of this paper. Agent-based 
models have been constructed via imposition of statistical distributions onto the population 
parameters to represent a random sampling of the possible dynamics of the individuals within the 
population. Due to the high computational demand of the advanced model simulation, it was 
required to use the UCT high powered cluster for model simulation, allowing several thousand hours 
of computer-time to be completed in a matter of days. 
To perform a sensitivity analysis of the two models, the same population structure and dynamics are 
represented in both models and Monte-Carlo methods are used to extract the theoretical statistics 
of the Malaria (and later the Ebola) virus. This paper focusses on the points of discrepancy between 
the two models, attempting to establish where sensitivity lies in both models and what parameters 
are indicated to be responsible. Statistically significant discrepancies between the population 
dynamics whilst infected by Malaria are included in the report this is including, but not limited to 
analysis on the proportion of disease incidence, treatment coverage and spread of resistance.  
 
Model 1: Simple Model 
 
The initial comparison will be of an S-I-R-S model. There is transition from Susceptible to Infected, 
from Infected to Recovered, from Recovered to Susceptible, and under a discrete time probability 
chain, in the stationary distribution this is seen by Bobashev et al. [2007] as a stochastic Markov-
chain there is transition from each state into itself. See appendix C for parameters used within SIRS 
model. 
Structure and Methodology of Basic Model 









                   (1) 
  
  
                  (2) 
  
  
                  (3) 
  and   are constants with respect to the process,   is the proportionality constant for successful 
transitions of disease, leading to    being an individual who state S’s force of infection and   is the 
rate of recovery of an individual in state I.   is the rate at which individuals become re-susceptible to 
the virus. Often a temporary immunity is built up, during which period an individual cannot be re-
infected this is represented by the “Recovered” state.  
This model ignores the population dynamics of mosquitos, the parameters used are indicated in 
appendix A. The parameter values are run through the above SIRS system under both a DE, and 
under an agent based model. The results are then compared against one another under a sensitivity 
analysis. 
M1: DEM simulation appendix A M2: Single ABM simulation appendix A 
  
 
two models were simulated per ABM and DEM methodology, the first was simulated by applying the 
steady-state conditions blindly, model 1.1; and the second model 1.2 was applied in order to meet 
specific state conditions of infection levels after several years. 
 













M1 SIRS: Differential Equation Model
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M2 SIRS: Stochastic Agent Based Model























Results of the Basic Model 
Refer to appendix D for output values. 




There are clearly very different steady states met within the two different methodologies. The 
following model corrects for this explicitly, and is explained in the analysis section. 
 





Analysis: Sensitivity of the basic Model 
The agent based methodology is highly sensitive to bias in a disease dying out. There are dormancy 
periods of a disease in reality, but no extinction. There were, of 1,000 simulations 191 simulations in 
which the disease reportedly died out. This needed to be explicitly modelled within the ABM to 
prevent it from happening, after which the model acted in a more representative manner.  
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In model 1.1: Low movement was seen over aggregation of 1000 simulations, reaching the 
proportions by time 600 of  
Agent Based Model 
S I R 
16.838 31.475 51.687 
 
   
Differential Equation Model 
S I R 
20.028 19.108 60.864 
 
After accounting for the flaw in an ABM of the probability of disease dying out, there is still a large 
discrepancy between the steady state conditions; particularly between the infected and the 
recovered states. The 95% confidence band of proportion in states by the end of the time period:  
 
Agent Based Model Confidence Intervals 
S I R 
(22.281;14.556) (22.281; 29.193) (22.281; 49.405) 
 
Differential Equation Model 95% Confidence Intervals 
S I R 
(18.076; 22.251) (16.185; 21.885) (59.045; 62.555) 
 
This can be attributed to the choice in distribution of the parameters onto the individuals in an ABM. 
In particular, the truncated normal distribution allows for a large variation in transition rates from 
recovered to susceptible representing Rahmandad and Sterman’s [2008] research where Malaria 
immunity can follow 5-year half-life or in some cases loss of immunity occurs rapidly. The truncated 
normal has caused several individual rates of movement from I to R to assume the value 0, hence 
allowing many individuals to remain indefinitely “recovered”, skewing the proportions of time spent 
in each state. 
Incidence rates can be compared at: 
                                            
                                                  
 
In the Differential Equation Model we see incidence rates to be 0.00160 after six months of 
population exposure to disease, in contrast to a very close 0.00151 in the Agent Based Model. 
Discrepancy is very evident whilst approaching steady state, after ten years the incidence rate in the 




Statistic Numbers in DEM Numbers in ABM 
Loss of immunity After 4 years Randomised, and causing 
several rates to assume a loss 
of immunity value of 0, and 
several to be very rapid. 
Cases over a week in the first 
exposure of the disease (6 
months after first exposure): 
0.157 per 1,000 individuals in 
population 
0.147 per 1,000 individuals in 
population, with a confidence 
interval of 
0.147 ± 0.01253716 on average 
Cases over a week towards 
steady state of the disease (10 
years after initial exposure): 
3.111 per 1,000 individuals in 
population 
2.691 per 1,000 individuals in 
population, with a confidence 
interval of 
2.691 ± 0.9290408 on average 
 
In model 1.2: A similar analysis is performed to identify differences; however there is constant 
overlap of the 95% confidence intervals, implying no significant differences between the ABM and 
DEM methodology predictions into population proportions found in the different states.  
Agent Based Model 95% Confidence Intervals 
S I R 
(22.281;14.556) (22.281; 29.193) (22.281; 49.405) 
 
Differential Equation Model 95% Confidence Intervals 
S I R 
(18.076; 22.251) (16.185; 21.885) (59.045; 62.555) 
 
 Discussion of Basic Model Methodologies 
From the simple model above, it is not possible to make any drastic conclusions as to discrepancies 
in the model. In particular, it is demonstrated by model 1.2 that it is simple to allow one model to 
replicate the other should the need arise. Model 1.2 was coded with the intention of using the 
model method at hand to deliberately end up with specific proportions of population in specific 
states. It is clearly acceptable for both of these methodologies to be used in epidemiology. It is 
however clear that the models cannot be used arbitrarily; and rather than focussing on steady state 
conditions and blindly plugging in parameter values; it is essential to rather find a parameter value 






Model 2: Vaccination Model 
 
This is the second model of the paper. A direct extension of the first model; allowing for a latency 
period of “exposure” to the disease as opposed to immediate infection; as well as a set of states, 
discriminating by the infection status of the disease, and by treatment presence or absence. 
It is possible to apply a nation-wide vaccine, and thus reduce the number of susceptibles, and/ or it 
is also possible to apply a treatment to known infecteds. With a treatment for an infected; 
stochasticity arises from the probability of success from the treatment. A vaccination model allows 
for treatment during any of the “susceptible”, “exposed” or “recovered” states. Considering the 
knowledge of an epidemic occurring, it seems futile to wait for infection prior to seeking treatment 
when a vaccination is readily available. Hence the more complex vaccination-model version is 
chosen to model under a Differential Equation and an Agent Based approach. 
Vaccination Model Structure 
Under this model, movement into and out of vaccination protection is allowed.  Individuals within a 
vaccinated state are indicated by the “T” suffix on the regular states. Additionally normal movement 
in the progression of Susceptible to Exposed to Infected to Recovered to Susceptible is allowed both 
within and outside of having the vaccination. An obvious adjustment for the rates is to reduce 
infection within the treatment group, as well as reduce duration of the disease in infected.  




S Susceptible ST Susceptible and vaccinated 
E Exposed ET Exposed and vaccinated 
I Infected IT Infected and vaccinated 




- Vaccination applied to individuals prior-infection with a non-zero probability 
A vaccinated individual will have: 
- a lower rate of infection 
- a higher rate of recovery 
- a lower force of mortality whilst in the infected state than would a non-vaccinated individual 
(ignored in this simulation due to equivalent birth and death rate assumptions, hence a non-
necessity to model death in the model Koella [2003])   
Allowance for any individual 
- Zero or one state-changes maximum per time period 
- Recovery can only occur from the “infected” state without treatment 
- Recovery can occur from the “exposed” state and “infected” with treatment 
- A temporary immunity is developed against the virus after recovery; hence while in the 
“recovered” state one cannot become re-infected immediately. 
- All transitions are done so at a stochastic rate, hence there is no fixed duration over which 
an individual remains in a state 
- States are explored according to an exponential distribution with rate as a function of the 
proportion of the population which is infected, a non-memoryless process  
Additionally  
- This model allows for transfer in and out of a treatment state. 
- The model design imposes a lifespan of the vaccination of 4 years in steady state 
- Additionally, the model assumes a lower risk for the vaccinated class against Malaria, 
proportional to the unvaccinated class. 
 
As in the simple model; each simulation allows a time-based flow of the population density through 
the states of the model. 
Model structures under this section:  
Model 2A A SEIRS with treatment policy, as presented 
above. Implementation of the vaccination as 
follows:  
1. Vaccination effect:  
Applied to S, E and I 
Drastically reduces rate of infection, and 
spreads up recovery of those whom are 
exposed/infected. 
2. When infection reaches above 10% of 
the population, assumed Government 
realizes the crisis, as imposes nation-
wide vaccination policies immediately.  
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3. When infection reduces below 2%, 
assumed policy was “successful”, and 
due to financial constraints, the 
vaccination policy is removed. This may 
be a realistic assumption is Western 
African countries, where internal 
medical structure is very limited. [Chan. 
2014] 
4. The vaccination is assumed to be 
temporary, and with an average of four 
years active. 
Model 2B with policy intervention In addition to the above:  
5. Effective vaccination is used. This is 
representative of effective medical care, 
and seen in the model by those who 
have access to a vaccination to never 
have the vaccination wear off. This is 
practical under the circumstances of a 
perfect vaccination, or a population 
following a good health care system: and 
taking a new vaccination as soon as the 
previous one expires. 
Model 2C with more effective vaccination policy In addition to above: 
6. Model explicitly controls levels of 
vaccination (to mimic historically 
suggested levels) 
 














Analysis of Model 2: ABM vs DEM in vaccination 
Model 2A: Average proportions of 1000 simulations (SEIRS with treatment) 
Agent Based Model: Non-treated states on left; Treated States on Right 
 
 
Differential Equation Model Non-treated states on left; Treated States on Right 
 
Stochastic Averages of ABM


































Stochastic Averages of ABM Treatment Class


































Stochastic Averages of DEM


































Stochastic Averages of DEM Treatment Class




































Discussion of rates in Model 2A Results 
The above graphs are an aggregation of 1000 simulations of the models. Discrepancies are observed 
in the overall behaviour of the models, prolifically in the rate of loss of vaccination. The increased 
rate of decrease in vaccination over the ABM causes the level of vaccination to drop to 0, whereas 
the proportional decrease of the DEM imitates a half-life process (for the process between the 
removal of the vaccination and the re-application) and does not reach 0 on its trajectory.   
See appendix J for an output of several statistics of output from the model. Statistics of interest are 
(foremost) the prevalence levels under the two methodologies and subsequently this paper 
discusses the vaccination levels, which were not controlled but allowed to vary.   
The Prevalence levels of the disease and the vaccination levels of the population are compared for 
both processes, and to compute a significant difference the confidence intervals are super-imposed 
onto the mean on the same plots. An overlapping confidence region is evidence that at the 5% 
significance level we cannot reject the possibility of there being equivalence between the two 
procedures over a single iteration.  
 
Model 2A: Prevalence of infection over 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note the dark grey area 
























































































Model 2A: Average Vaccination levels over population in 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note 
the dark grey area as the overlapping confidence region. 
 
 
The magnitude of average prevalence of disease within the population in the ABM model dominates 
the DEM model in magnitude; however it is non-statistically significant. There is a statistically 
significant difference in the vaccination levels after time 250. After investigation into the cause of 
this discrepancy; it was established to be that within the ABM (but not the DEM) the number of 
infected individuals dropped below 2% in the majority of simulations (See appendix J); allowing the 
vaccination policy to be removed from the system. 
Incidences over the first year are higher in an ABM than in the DEM on average, with more exposed 
and infected individuals after a year in an ABM see appendix J (this pattern continues into further 
years, shown graphically above). The results are not statistically significant, with both models having 
confidence intervals which include 0 at 1 year. The volatility in the model was originally over 
predicted in the ABM, biased but the “extinction” allowed in the ABM which in naturally controlled 
in the DEM. This unnecessary volatility was removed for the graphs above by repeating the analysis 
under explicitly controlled conditions for extinction. The ABM allows variation in the individual 
movement in different simulations due to a better modelling ability of heterogeneity in the 
population. 
Further looking at the difference in average levels between DEM and ABM in model 2A: 
It is also possible to make a comparison of the average between both models. This has a much less 
intuitive interpretation; as it is not what would be expected in a single simulation. It is however a 
very good indicator as to whether, on average, the DEM and ABM modelled proportions are 
different from one another. 1000 simulations of each model have been taken, and the aggregated 



























































































results have been taken. In a comparison of averages, volatility has been decreased by a factor 
of√    ; a proof of the distributional benefits in variance reduction is derived in Appendix H.   
 
 
Additional model: Model 2B with policy intervention 
See appendix K for graphs of average state proportions by time. We find, in the diagram below, 
virtually no difference in the levels of prevalence of the disease. We do however observe a higher 



































































Model 2B: Prevalence of infection over 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note the dark grey area 
as the overlapping confidence region. 
 
 
No significant conclusions can be drawn from the initial 200-250 weeks, but after this (once infection 
is exceptionally low) the models reach significantly different equilibriums in level of population left 
vaccinated. There is a strong similarity in that there is a steady-state met in both models, but note 










































































































Model 2B: Average Vaccination levels over population in 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note 
the dark grey area as the overlapping confidence region. 
 
 
Similar differences between the models are exhibited as per model 2A. Within this structure: the 
differences in methodology are significant but the underlying nature creating these differences 
occurs from the same sources:  
- ABM more reactionary, having more extreme distribution of rates due to natural 
heterogeneity in the data 
- ABM more volatile 
- DEM is more stable and rates of flows are more controlled. It is difficult to impose a volatile 
distribution onto a DEM as this affects variation of the entire population. This would require 
an addition of several (probably unrealistic) assumptions 
- ABM reduces infections towards a “steady state” 
- DEM tends towards “steady state”, but does not necessarily reach the steady state  
- Without the second policy change, (of retracting the vaccination at 2% infection) the ABM 
model would fully reduce the level of infection, whereas DEM would reduce infection 
proportionately 
- When vaccination policy taken away from ABM, under the DEM the process is occurring 
much slower, and more infected have been left in the model at this stage.  
- This causes a second epidemic to occur faster in DEM than in ABM 
 
 











































































































Additional model: Model 2C with more effective vaccination policy 
Model 2C: Prevalence of infection over 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note the dark grey area 
as the overlapping confidence region. 
 
 
No significant conclusions can be drawn from the initial 200-250 weeks, but after this (once infection 
is exceptionally low) the models reach significantly different equilibriums in level of population left 
vaccinated. There is a strong similarity in that there is a steady-state met in both models, but note 
















































































































Model 2C: Average Vaccination levels over population in 1000 DEM and ABM simulations. Note 
the dark grey area as the overlapping confidence region. 
 
 
As expected when explicitly controlling for specific attributes (here; controlling for the level of 
vaccination) we find both the models to be statistically identical in mean. There is constant 
overlapping of the confidence intervals. In the majority of the timeline in fact, we have that the 95% 
confidence interval of the ABM is contained within the 95% confidence interval of the DEM. So again 
it demonstrates that under realistic assumptions, an ABM exhibits more volatility. This can be 
interpreted as the ABM having the ability to model more possible dynamics that the population 




It is evident that the DEM and ABM model structures are causing different results and predictions, as 
was hypothesised during the introduction. It is evident that the volatility can be caused by multiple 
sources and these can be determined empirically through application of mutual changes in both the 
models and analysis of the results. The nature of a Differential Equation model causes the steady-
state equations to be approached asymptotically. In contrast, the steady state equations are reached 
by an Agent Based model more easily. This causes large discrepancy when an exogenous shock is 
forced onto the model, such an imposition or retraction of a policy. It has been concluded that the 
volatility can be exaggerated through focus on the steady-state equations. It should be noted that 
larger increments in uncertainty cause a larger variance and difference between the 2 models. 

















































































Additionally, it is possible to control for discrepancies by understanding the nature of the steady-
stead in advance and applying the more suitable model.    
 
Model 3: Mass Screen-and-Treat 
 
Due to the recent epidemics of the Ebola haemorrhagic fever, this paper was extended to examine 
a mass-screen-and-treat policy for this disease.  
Ebola Structure 
It is necessary to differentiate the EVD model from all prior models under the following 2 conditions:  
1) EVD, unlike Malaria, is transmitted through direct human-human contact; hence the 
interaction with vectors is not applicable, but special components are necessary.  
2) There is a high infection rate, and a high death rate of the infected. Models must be 
equipped to deal with deaths and hence, an endogenously decreasing population.  
Simulations are designed to reflect a West African Country, such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
where R0>1 and there exist epidemics. The conditions of these three countries’ health care systems 
are “lacking human and infrastructure resources”- WHO {2} [2014]. The access to medical facilities is 
highly limited, with an estimated 2 doctors per 100’000 individuals; and unsafe traditional burial 
procedures [Chan. 2014]. The primary purpose of containment is to hinder the infected individuals 
from posing as a further threat (via quarantine).  
Ebola treatment: 
This paragraph introduces the policies and practices intended to be introduced by the WHO, 
specifically designed to reduce the recent Ebola epidemic: 
1. Reduce risk of hospitalized transmission 
2. Reduce risk of public transmission 
3. Reduce risk of wildlife to human transmission 
4. Containment 
5. Reduction in fatality 
Sources: Chan, 2014. Lashley and Durham, 2007. WHO {2}, 2014. WHO {3}, 2014. 
The WHO has established the optimal procedure to be a vaccination process, however under 
literature on treatment policy; medical author of this P. Davis PhD [2014] confirms that there is a 
treatment for Ebola, however not yet FDA-approved. The WHO [WHO {3}. 2014] has decided to 
implement a “vaccination” policy, of which there will be an estimated five million doses of treatment 
available by April 2015. This is not enough to meet the population levels of infected countries, and 
hence a screen-and-treat policy is more applicable. Additionally, the cost of misdiagnosis of healthy 
patients has not been tested yet, and as such it is preferential to minimize dosing healthy individuals.  
See appendix L for further disclosure of the policy decisions in Ebola procedure: The outcomes of the 
WHO high-level meeting of October 2014.  
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The controls of Ebola are to be modelled following two manners:  
- allowing a lower rate of transfer for “known” infected due to a quarantine procedure 
- lower death rate for treated infected, due to Intravenous therapy (injection of fluids) and  
Oral hydration.  
 
Model Characteristics 
This paragraph covers the details of the structure required in an epidemiological model of the 
Ebola haemorrhagic fever. The state space and the flows between states are presented. 
Movement between states is coded in R by a random individualized movement according to 
exponential processes.  Refer to Appendix F for discussion of the randomness modelling distribution, 
and Appendix G for movement parameters. Effectively, the states affected by the screen-and-treat 
process are those which are not known to be infected, treated, recovered or dead. Additionally, a 
treatment imposed on a recovered or non-susceptible individual will have no effect in movement. 
This leaves only 3 states, S, E and I, from which being vaccinated/treated will allow them to move 
into non-susceptible; exposed-treated and infected-treated respectively.  
 
 
The large dispersion of the population allows for specific areas to be infected more than others. 
Hence due to an inadequate health care system not everyone can be reached so focus will logically 
be placed only on areas known to be infected. This is simulated via setting a very low rate of 
vaccination for non-exposed individuals. This is a closed population and the assumption of natural 
death being offset by natural birth accounts for exits and entrance to the population and a fixed 




The models are required to account for dynamics of spatial patterns. Ebola is transmitted through 
contacts; hence the number of infectious contacts needs to be modelled relative to proximity of 
infected individuals. 
Condition to be replicated: within a 3rd world population, there is segregation in living environments. 
There are large distances between villages in the outskirts of the urban environments. It has been 
documented that up to 60% of Ebola transfer is from unsafe burial rituals [Chan. 2014]. This affects 
only the individuals close to the infected dead; and is not carried into neighbouring villages with the 
same high rate. Movement between villages will allow transfer of the virus, but as a much lower rate 
than those in close proximity; i.e. the same village.  
 In an Agent-Based Model 
Similarly to an implicit stratification technique: Individuals are divided into subgroups. This is done 
by ordering the list of individuals and maintaining the order; then allowing a specific number of 
interactions within a range forward and backwards from the position this individual is in. A binomial 
distribution is fitted to each individual within a range k of the infected individual. Additionally, 
separate parameters are necessary for individuals whom are known to be infected, and those who 
are unknown, or improperly dealt with [Chan, 2014]. Refer to Appendix G for full model. For the 
models, it was chosen to select 10 and 4 as the distances, and 0.1 and 0.02 as daily infection 
probabilities for individuals within these distances in respectively unknown and known infected 
individuals.  
  Measured, for each 
individual in the 
respective state by: 
Binomial(10,0.1) 
Rate of transfer of infection from those who are 
unknowingly mingling in population 
   Measured, for each 
individual in the 
respective state by: 
Binomial(4, 0.02) 
Rate of transfer of those who are “Quarantined/ 
hospitalized” and treated correctly given the 
abilities of the country: I.e. the successful 
outcomes of a screen and treat protocol 
 
In a Differential Model 
Since it is not possible for a DEM to incorporate a form of individualistic proximity measures; a 
different measure must be constructed to account for the spatial discrepancy. This can be done in 
one do two manners: either by subgrouping the population and assuming homogeneity within the 
groups, or by a function   
 
               
                  to correct for the inability to reach 
further than k individuals away in distance. The first approach is a simpler method, and effectively 
uses ABM methodology in allowing separate characteristics for separate groups. It is more valid 
when performing a sensitivity analysis to use the direct DEM approach, applying 
  
 
               
                  a decreasing function with the proportion of the population 
remaining uninfected, and as such allowing for harder “reach” of individuals in distant uninfected 




Rate of change of state E (See appendix G for full model):  
  
  
            
      
 
               
                  
linear or non-linear model, with 
coefficients      as with ABM 
Rate of gaining infection, a function of the 
number of infecteds 
 
Results 
See appendix H for parameters and rates used. 
Model 3: Comparison 
 Comparison of Susceptible; Exposed; Infected; Dead-- (infectious); Dead++ (non-infectious) 















Comparison of Exposed with treatment; Infected with treatment; Recovered with treatment; Recovered 




Between the ABM and the DEM screen-and-treat models, there are no significant differences in the 
initial phases of implementation. There is consistency in description of most of the dynamics of the 
population, with a few model specific details: See appendix M for enhances images. 
 
I) DEM: With explicit compensation for spatial dynamics 
In this procedure, a function of the states is used to alter the rate at which individuals 
are selected. The objective is to mimic an ABM, and there is no statistical difference in 
this model and the ABM counterpart. The function was selected via trial-and-error, and 
is also affected by the number of individuals in the population. Under the observed 
model; the initial spike in exposure is slightly higher (statistically insignificant) than an 
implicitly stratified ABM and marginally, (but statistically significant) lower than a 
compensated ABM. 
 
Refer to Appendix I for further details of selection of optimal  (
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                   [                     ]   
  
 
               




II) ABM: With direct modelling procedure for spatial dynamics  
There is a large increase in variance using spatial dynamics, as there is no knowledge in 
advance of the exact dynamics of interactions either within or between the strata. This 
aggregation incorporates models which allow for several segregations and interactions 
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within the population, hence due to a large stochasticity as opposed to the other 
models, there is a higher variance in the model. This procedure is able to account for all 
realistic variations between outcomes.  
The variability difference in the implicitly stratified ABM is due to the nature of agent-based 
interactions, which can be controlled and fully modelled within the ABM but cannot be moderated 
under differential movements. A DEM provides a much more regulated procedure as opposed to the 
variability of the ABM: this is seen to be due to the DEM inability to model extreme-events as can be 
done under a spatially-distinguished ABM. Agents-based exposure has been designed to incorporate 
stratified interactions based on a heterogeneous population, and hence transmitting exposure in 
different manners in different simulations, whereas the DEM cannot be programmed in a manner 
that logically captures both dynamics of stochastic exposure to individuals based on relative position 
to infected individuals. The DEM can only account for a stochastic average exposure of susceptibles, 
and hence provides a much less volatile, and in so a less realistic spread in representation of possible 
system outcomes.   
Further exploration of the Methodology 
Two additional models are viewed: the first is a DEM, simulated for the purpose of finding a 
natural differential approach to the problem, without any assumptions or adjusting equation. The 
second model is an ABM simulated with the purpose of estimating the DEM results, i.e. allowing 
the same adjustment to be applied to “compensate” for special discrepancies, not explicitly 
applying special differences as the above Model 3 ABM does. See appendix M for the graphical 
plots. 
III) DEM: Without explicit compensation for spatial distinction in population 
This model naturally falls short of the ability to compare to an explicitly spatially-
distinguished ABM. There are significant differences in the initial phases of the model. 
The uptake of the screen-and-treat procedure is not equivalent to that of an ABM. In the 
initial 50 days of the uptake of the policy, there is a large spike in exposed individuals to 
the virus, slightly higher (statistically significant) than an implicitly stratified ABM and 
marginally, (but statistically insignificant) lower than a compensated ABM. 
 
IV) ABM: With explicit compensation for spatial distinction in population 
There is a relatively small confidence band for all states within the initial period. The 
model is less volatile than any of the predecessors, yet becomes as volatile during the 
intermediate time period. The general dynamics of the system are equivalently 




There are positive attributes through the ABM approach should there be a segregation of the 
population within the model. This segregation must necessarily be known in advance and have the 
model fitted around it. Appendix E[I] displays the dilemma caused by an ABM modelling of the 
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behaviour of a process with stochastically programmed segregation: the probability distribution of 
each state is too wide to allow meaningful interpretation. However, with the segregation known in 
advance, research power, time and money would be required to find model representative of the 
population. Similarly, unless programmed against it, an ABM has the possibility of a disease dying 
out. Often this is unrealistic as vector-strains of the population cannot be controlled, however this 
needs to be explicitly stated and then modelled. Appendix E[II] contains a diagram portraying a large 
confidence bound, when including the possibility of a disease dying out there would be a constant 
proportion of “susceptibles” at 100% and all other states at 0%, resulting in very biased estimates of 
the averages and variances, and non-interpretable results.   
Model 3 (IV) an ABM: With explicit compensation for spatial distinction in population provides the 
conclusions that even in complexity; it appears possible for an ABM to produce results which are not 
statistically different to those produced by a DEM. However, model 3 (III) a DEM: Without explicit 
compensation for spatial distinction in population suggests that the natural forms of the ABM for 
modelling spatially-distinguished spaces appears superior to what a DEM is able to achieve. 
 
Implications and Model-Shortfalls 
As with any disease modelling, regardless of the complexity of the model it is a simplified 
representation of the epidemiological process. A model accurately representing a system relies on 
the inclusion of all relevant contributing factors, some of which are difficult to impossible to model. 
The models I have constructed have been under the intention of targeting differences between an 
ABM and a DEM model. The data has been directly designed from report summaries of medical 
records, yet still it has been self-constructed. My project has covered the umbrella forms of the ABM 
and DEM models, but they have failed to account for niche factors within specific populations. 
Hence to make an accurate statement of the discrepancies between the models per population, it is 
necessary to formulate the parameters accordingly to the specific dynamics of the targeted 
population.  
Modelling populations without extensive medical records (as is the case in a West Africa [Chan. 
2014]) comes with many difficulties due to the nature of right-censored individuals: those whom are 
vaccinated and then fail to be recorded again due to poor tracking and data management in third-
world countries, as well as left-truncated individuals: non-vaccinated individuals who will only enter 
the observational design if they contract the disease. Ebola is prevalent in third world countries; 
hence the accessibility of medical care is not an immediately-available amenity to the majority of the 
populations; especially considering the initial symptoms resemble a common flu, and may remain 
unreported. Observations are hence disproportionately missing, likely in a non-random manner. The 
presence of non-randomness requires imputation, and the best imputation will be based on other 
countries observational data. Thus, the model will be biased towards countries with more complete 
data sets.  
Additionally even if individuals are treated, due to the third world health practices, there is no 
guarantee of an accurate record of Malaria/Ebola data, adding to the missing observation problem. 
And lastly, it is impossible to perform experimental studies for ethical reasons on infected human 
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individuals. Thus the trials will be case-control studies, based on exposure status to the vaccination, 
suffering from the right-censored and left-truncated data problems. In summary, these model 
comparison techniques cannot be used to exactly establish the model discrepancies, but they give a 
good indication.  
 
Extensions 
Further Analysis of Differences owing to model structure 
This paper has covered several aspects of difference analysis between an Agent Based Model and a 
Differential Equation Model, but none of the analysis has been performed to a full conclusive extent. 
Evidence of differences has been shown to exist, and general trends in location of differences have 
been described (predominantly steady-state conditions, and ability to account for population 
dynamics in inter and intra-stratum). Further areas for research to be considered are the optimal 
form on the function  (
 
               
                ), which allows for a DEM to be comparable 
to a stratified ABM, and if a generic case  (
 
               
                    ) could be 
developed to apply to all cases rather than attempting to minimize the difference between the ABM 
and DEM by first principles. Similarly, work can be done into the optimal procedure to model the 
disease extinction, as opposed to the model restrictions used in this paper which entirely prevent 
less than one person to be infected in an ABM and hence coerce the disease to remain an active 
threat as opposed to a dormant state which is seen in reality but not in the models presented. 
Improved Disease Modelling 
The model comparison technique used in the paper can be used to recommend a superior model 
procedure for the diseases under examination. Recommendations to establish model accuracy: find 
more reliable data; hence a population-specific recommendation can be made on model preference. 
The discrepancies I have established are theoretical based on generalized disease properties, and 
hence have highlighted areas to be cautious of. To allow these models to provide recommendations, 
a more thorough and complete survey is required.  
Other extensions include Cyber-Terrorism (not-recommended), Bio-Terrorism (not recommended) 
and Counter-Bio-Terrorism. 
Cyber-Terrorism 
The onset of fear in society is a drive to reach out for protective measures. Johnston and Warkentin 
have demonstrated the empirical impacts of fear within the IT world [2010]; specifically how under 
the influence of fear, computer users are on average more susceptible to fraud under a clouded 
judgment. Several hackers have used this as an opportunity to install malware on computers, 
sending seemingly informative emails on Ebola policies, claiming to contain procedural protocols 
from the World Health Organisation [Perlroth. 2014]. Although not a direct implication, statistical 
models can be used to predict the impact of a disease outbreak on the level of cyber-terrorism 
related to the disease. More directly, there are applications of infectious disease modelling in both 




Reported Incidences of Ebola-related emails with Harmful Intent – [Perlwroth. 2014] 
 
 
Bio-Terrorism and Counter Bio-Terrorism 
Without further evidence, conspiracy theories will not be discussed in this report; the discussion will 
look solely at the possibilities of bio-warfare from an epidemiological perspective.  Lashley F. 
Durham D. [2007] mention the possibility of haemorrhagic fevers in Bio-Terrorism, and several more 
impactful HFs are mentioned as being “preferential” to Ebola. Opinions of the role of haemorrhagic 
fevers (HFs) in Bio-terrorism from experts in disease control possibilities range from dismissive to it 
being an active concern which is exhibited in research performed by Lashley and Durham.  
The primary reasons provided against the plausibility of haemorrhagic fever viruses (HVs) include but 
are not limited to  
1. the lack of aerosol ability of an HV 
2. instability of the HV 
3. high profile of infected 
4. lack of access to the virus 
Jagminas and Antosia [2006] have looked at the potential of viral haemorrhagic fevers which 
currently have been classified as a Biological Warfare Agent (BWA) of category A, implying a high 
toxicity, but a low range. Category C relates to the most problematic BWA, which are unpredicted, 
and require policies to readily be in operation in order to avoid a crisis [Balili-Mood, et al. 2013].  
With the new strain of Zaire ebolavirus, there is an increased accessibility to the virus, a higher level 
of stability and clearly a high ability to cause death. Balili-Mood, et al. [2013] discloses that meeting 
even one such condition is enough for the virus to pose the potential to be weaponized. The 
Majority of (Lashley and Durham’s understanding of) expert reasoning against the potential use of 
haemorrhagic viruses as BWA is not valid with the outbreak of the Zaire ebolavirus, and it hence 
stands as a potential choice for bio-terrorism activity in Category C. Clearly, the same models used 
by statisticians to model the effectiveness of treatment policies can be used with minor changes by 
bio-terrorists to model the optimal manner of execution of a biological warfare agent. Historically, it 
is plausible that the ineffectiveness of an HV would have been indicated to bio-terrorist criminals 
through a process of model simulation.  
All aforementioned authors on the topic of bio-terrorism have mentioned the necessity of 
preparation as the first step to hinder a Category C BWA.  Governmental protocols must already be 
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in place, such that the reaction to a bio-warfare onset is instantaneous. An epidemic requires an R0 
value above 1, and a Category C BWA is designed with this intention. Due to the exponentially 
increasing rate at which a population becomes infected, it is the first few cases of an infectious 
disease which are most crucial to stop. Similarly, it is necessary to prioritize the correct dynamics of 
the disease, whether they are treating infected individuals, containment, etc. The most effective 
methods to quell an epidemic, be it quarantine, contact-tracing, mass screen-and-treat, can only be 
determined under the correct model assumptions. Hence, it is crucial in counter-bio-terrorism to be 
fully engaged in accurate model building, primarily, accurate model structure. 
A brief analysis of a bio-terrorist implementation of an infectious disease is given in Model 4:  
Model 4: Introductory Model to Bio-Terrorism 
Comparison of Susceptible; Exposed; Infected; Dead-- (infectious); Dead++ (non-infectious) 
In a Differential Equation Model with compensation for spatial dynamics 
 





Comparison of Exposed with treatment; Infected with treatment; Recovered with treatment; Recovered 
In a Differential Equation Model with compensation for spatial dynamics 
 
In an Agent Based Model with direct spatial dynamics 
 
 
Model 4: Analysis of results 
Very similar patterns to model 3 are exhibited in model 4, with the obvious exception of the initial 
(days 1-5) high rate of infection. There is a fast-acting infection period, specifically parameterised to 
allow for a 90% infection of the population within the first week. This is exhibited with statistical 
indifference in the mean between both above modelling procedures. There is a much higher 
variance in a spatially incorporated ABM. This is due to the possible coverage of all population 
movement dynamics that a spatial ABM allows, which is very difficult to replicate with other models 
as discussed previously. The sharp drop in DEM susceptible levels does not have a right tail 
comparable to the ABM: it is seen that the DEM does not account for spatial distance well and more 
detailed analysis must be done before finding an appropriate DEM model. Additionally; allowing a 
higher compensation for the initial rate of infection in the DEM would result in a smaller decline in 
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recovered individuals (dark grey), which is already lower in magnitude than the ABM. Restructuring 
of the models to follow one another would be necessary, but it is worthwhile to note that without 
the restructuring, both models offer different predictions as they have not yet reached their steady 
states, and thus the stead-state conditions mentioned in the discussion of model 2 do not hold, and 
until steady-state is reached, the dynamics of the population under the two models are different.  
Conclusions 
There are certainly discrepancies between different modelling methodologies. The most pronounced 
differences become evident with more complex models. Specifically, if dynamics of a population’s 
infection status are dependant explicitly on individuals within the population (such as individual 
spatial statistics) an ABM can account for this easily, where as a DEM requires an additional set of 
assumptions. Additionally, a DEM has been seen to introduce additional uncertainty in the model 
where it is not necessary. When making decisions in terms of the optimal methodology to select, it is 
important to bear in mind the computational time required by an ABM in comparison to a DEM (this 
paper’s relatively simplistic ABM models required up to 600 hours in computing time per model 
reported). A DEM can in most instances approximate ABM results relatively well and this alone may 
be justification enough to not use agent-based methodology in some situations.  
There is a downside to both models in the start-up period; in a DEM there is the assumption of 
fractional movement, which is unrealistic in a situation of very few infections and less than one new 
individual becoming infected in one time unit. Similarly, an ABM requires distributional assumptions 
which are highly influential on the initial phases, and could make large differences in rate of 
progression of a disease. The ABM allows for a realistic volatility measure, under the assumption 
that the model has been validified and verified and is representing the true population movements. 
There is a necessity in agent-based methodology not to allow for extinction of the disease, and 
hence a minimum number of infected individuals are held within the population, which may cause 
bias in the ABM results.  
A DEM is inferior to an ABM in modelling heterogeneous individuals within a population. 
Restructuring a DEM to account for spatial (or another) dynamic requires verification, and finding 
the optimal form of  (
 
               
                ) which is difficult to impute due to a lack of 
historical data. A DEM has generally is able to mimic an ABM if required, however this requires first 
designing the ABM and then the DEM to mimic it. This introduces unnecessary variation and 
consumes additional time. In this instance, it appears that an ABM is a superior choice. 
Agent based methodology appears naturally more reactionary with regards to shocks since the 
model has the ability to adjust at heterogeneous rates, however similar patterns are seen in both 
models. An important conclusion between both models is that discrepancy does arise from the 
steady-state nature. And as such, if modelling both models according to average flows, the ABM will 
approach a steady state faster than the DEM. A steady state does exist for both methods, and once 
in steady-state they are equally well maintained regardless of methodology.  
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this paper: as a result of the steady-state nature, 
one should not take a measurement from a model which has not been explicitly validated within the 
model. In advance of deciding the methodology to use; one must analyse the data, (or the summary 
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statistics to be replicated) and decide on the appropriate structure (choice of states and flows) and 
the measurements to be used (such as incidence, prevalence, vaccination levels). The methodology 
must then ensure capturing of the relevant quantities to be measured, and these must be controlled 
within the model. To determine the efficiency of a model; it should be verified in its ability to not 
only replicate historical observations and historical data sets; but the model should also be able to 
show a reasonable amount of volatility and as such not only show the expected outcome, but the 
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R0 is defined as the number of secondary infections. Statistically; it is equivalent to the expected 
number of infections which are caused per newly infected individual.  
R0 > 1 is generally enough to define an epidemic to occur 
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Parameters S-I-R-S   Estimate Description: Daily Rates 
β 2.1 ×     




Rate of infection 
α 0.0023±0.0005 days Rate of recovery 
   0.022/day Number of secondary contacts from an infected 
human 
   0.097±0.017 Infection susceptibility 
         (200 weeks) Rate of loss of immunity 
     0.0001 / day Death rate= birth rate 
  (population size) 1000  
   
      
         
 
 
   
         
 
 
 (Koella and Antia. 2003)       (4) 
  Rate of loss of immunity against malaria,   can reportedly be as short as 2 weeks. For a simplistic 
model,   is assumed to be independent of the proportion of infected, instead set as a 
constant immunity level of 4 years, approximately thus a weekly recovery rate of 0.005. 
  proportion of infected humans  
  proportion of susceptible humans 
  proportion of recovered humans 
       1 




Appendix B: Parameters M2 (Dietz, et al. 1974. And Mandal, et al. 
2011) 
Parameters S-I-R-S   Estimate Description: Daily Rates 
β 2.1 ×     




Rate of infection 
α 0.0023±0.0005 days Rate of recovery 
   0.022/day Number of secondary contacts from an infected 
human 
   0.097±0.017 Infection susceptibility 
         (200 weeks) Rate of loss of immunity 
     0.0001 / day Death rate= birth rate 
  (population size) 1000  
(1) ᵾ   0.25 (4 weeks)  Rate of evidence of disease within exposed 
patients (transfer from E to I) 
(2) ƨ 0.01 Rate of Administration of Vaccination 
 
(1) ᵾ : Rate of transfer from E to I. The inverse of time spend with Malaria, infected but without 
a high enough plasmodium count to pass on the infection to a susceptible mosquito is 
estimated (Mandal et al. 2011):  
a. mosquitos: tm=10 days 
b. humans: th=21 days 
This is aggregated as 4 weeks in a DEM-rate parameter of 0.25; and imposed over a 
probability distribution of 0.1+0.3 x U(0,1) under the ABM model. 
 
In the differential equation Model, this is structured by assuming the steady state incidence 
rate 0.3111, we need to find a parameter that allows for an ᵾ of 0.25.  
∑  
   
     ⁄    
                            
 
Hence the Exposed state will allow emission of 0.750, adjusting the total time spent by an 
“individual” in state E to be 4 weeks. 
(2) ƨ :  Susceptible individuals are assumed to successively be vaccinated with a 50% probability 
over a year period. This translates to a weekly rate of movement from S to ST of 
approximately 0.01. 
∑         
  
   
     
   ⁄      
                    
 






Appendix C: Coding Discrepancies 
The table below highlights the differences accounted for in the coding behind the two models: 
Model Qualities to be 
represented 
Agent-Based Differential Equation 
S, I, E, R Proportion of the total population in represented state ϵ [0,1] 
β                  
α 
    
 
                
  
                 
τ                      ; 
A normal distribution defined 
over (0,+Inf) and rescaled to 
integrate to 1. 
                          
 
 
Appendix D: M1 Output 
 DEM ABM 
Time to reach Steady State. 
Since there appears to be very 
little cyclical movement, we 
will allow a “low movement” to 
be approximated by a 
movement of under 0.1% in 
proportion of population in S, I 
and R for 1 month.   
Low movement occurs after 
time 262:  
S I R 
14.124 21.196 64.679 
14.209 21.095 64.697 
14.292 20.995 64.713 
14.376 20.897 64.727 
 
By time 600 there has been 




Low movement occurs after 
time 220: 
S I R 
32.691 33.083 34.226 
32.646 33.010 34.344 
32.613 32.940 34.448 
32.587 32.872 34.541 
 
By time 600 there has been 




Proportion in SS 20.028 19.108 60.864 
 
32.794 26.072 41.134 
 
Proportion of time extinction 
of disease occurred: 
0 0.191 
Loss of immunity After 4 years Randomised, and causing 
several rates to assume a loss 
of immunity value of 0, and 
several to be very rapid. 
Cases over a week in the first 
exposure of the disease (6 
months after first exposure): 
0.157 per 1000 individuals in 
population 
0.147 per 1000 individuals in 
population, with a confidence 
interval of 
0.147 ± 0.01253716 on average 
Cases over a week towards 
steady state of the disease (10 
years after initial exposure): 
3.111 per 1000 individuals in 
population 
2.691 per 1000 individuals in 
population, with a confidence 
interval of 




Appendix E[I]: M4 Complexity I 
Stochastic behaviour of relationship structure; if one does not know the relationships in advance. 
 
Appendix E[II]: M4 Complexity II 
System cures itself. Hence there is a chance of 0 infections immediately… then entire system breaks 
down, massive volatility between those which are not cures within. [Same issue as above, but time 1 
& 2 are the deciders] 
 
 












































































Appendix F: Distribution Equivalence 
Given 2 processes,         , and           
       
       
   
     
  
 
          
        
Hence, it is equivalent to model the binary event     }, with          as the probability of at 
least one occurrence of a Poisson process with the same parameter.  
 
Appendix G: Parameters M3 
  
  
                        
  
  
           ;           
  
  
              ;      
  
   
  
                     The remainder of the flows follow accordingly. 
 
 
Parameters Model Estimate Description: Daily Rates 
  0.8 screening process 
  0.1 constant, reduction of screening 
effectiveness 
  ~exp(0.1) Transfer E to I, rate of infectivity 
  ~exp(1/7) rate of recovery from infected 
   ~exp(1/7) 
Note, not competing 
with death movement. 
adjusted rate of recovery for treated 
individuals 
  ~exp(1/7) rate of death, allowing for 50% death over a 
14 day period 
  ~runif(1,21) rate of losing infectiousness post-recovery 
  0 Rate of false discovery 
    f(E,I,EV,IV,RI,DI) 
linear model, with 
coefficients      
Rate of gaining infection, a function of the 
number of infecteds 
  Measured, for each 
individual in the 
respective state by: 
Binomial(10,0.1) 
Rate of transfer of infection from those who are 
unknowingly mingling in population 
   Measured, for each 
individual in the 
Rate of transfer of those who are “Quarantined/ 
hospitalized” and treated correctly given the 
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respective state by: 
Binomial(8, 0.1) 
abilities of the country: I.e. the successful 
outcomes of a screen and treat protocol 
 
Appendix H: Sample Statistics 
An averaged confidence interval of the form below provides the expected 95% confidence interval of 
time in the system. 
 ̅̅        ̅ 
Where  ̅ is the aggregated sampling variation of the 1000 samples. Note      
  
  




∑        ̅ 
   
   
    
 
   is an asymptotically unbiased estimate of ơ, however with a small sample of only the set of 
observations within the bias can be reduced by aggregating the estimates of the sample standard 
error and reduce the likelihood of overestimating or underestimating the confidence interval for the 
completion times. 
Asymptotically            (
  
   
    
 )  (
  
   
)
 
        
  
   
. 
  
       
  
    
  
 
Not if we look at the weighted average of 1000   
 ’s 
 ̅  ∑
∑        ̅ 
   
   
          
    
   
 
 ̅       
  




         
 is an upper bound of the variance of  ̅  n=min(  , i=1,2,…,1000). 
 
 
Appendix I: M3 Extended Plots 
 
DEM model: explicitly accounting for stratification 
 (
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DEM model: explicitly accounting for stratification 
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states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year states at 1 year 
Susceptible 0.9709 0.01781 0 2.075 0.9845 0.0134 0.1537 1.815 
Exposed 0.006373 0.004556 0 0.2887 0.0031 0.003263 0 0.2054 
Infected 0.01812 0.0117 0 0.7436 0.009648 0.008862 0 0.5589 
Recovered 0.004572 0.003041 0 0.1931 0.002752 0.002409 0 0.1521 
S (with Vac) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E (with Vac) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I (with Vac) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R (with Vac) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vaccination 
(Binary) 0.001 0.03162 0 1.961 0 0 0 0 
 
states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years states at 2 years 
Susceptible 7.28E-01 1.41E-01 0.00E+00 9.47E+00 8.24E-01 1.60E-01 0.00E+00 1.07E+01 
Exposed 3.24E-02 1.03E-02 0.00E+00 6.72E-01 1.59E-02 8.91E-03 0.00E+00 5.68E-01 
Infected 1.38E-01 5.76E-02 0.00E+00 3.71E+00 7.59E-02 4.88E-02 0.00E+00 3.10E+00 
Recovered 5.20E-02 2.78E-02 0.00E+00 1.78E+00 2.76E-02 2.05E-02 0.00E+00 1.30E+00 
S (with Vac) 3.14E-02 3.35E-02 0.00E+00 2.11E+00 3.98E-02 6.64E-02 0.00E+00 4.15E+00 
E (with Vac) 1.14E-04 3.62E-04 0.00E+00 2.26E-02 1.28E-03 2.17E-03 0.00E+00 1.36E-01 
I (with Vac) 8.20E-05 3.22E-04 0.00E+00 2.00E-02 1.38E-03 2.33E-03 0.00E+00 1.46E-01 
R (with Vac) 1.79E-02 2.13E-02 0.00E+00 1.34E+00 1.43E-02 2.64E-02 0.00E+00 1.65E+00 
Vaccination 


















S->E 8.50E-04 3.57E-04 0.00E+00 2.30E-02 1.49E-03 2.08E-03 0.00E+00 1.31E-01 
R->S 2.12E-03 2.57E-03 0.00E+00 1.62E-01 6.56E-04 8.85E-04 0.00E+00 5.55E-02 
I->R 1.12E-03 1.20E-03 0.00E+00 7.57E-02 9.18E-04 1.22E-03 0.00E+00 7.67E-02 




E->T 1.52E-03 2.04E-03 0.00E+00 1.28E-01 4.39E-04 1.01E-03 0.00E+00 6.33E-02 
S->T 2.53E-04 7.79E-04 0.00E+00 4.85E-02 1.52E-03 2.45E-03 0.00E+00 1.53E-01 
R->T 5.53E-04 1.31E-03 0.00E+00 8.15E-02 7.47E-04 7.97E-04 0.00E+00 5.01E-02 
IT->I 2.95E-04 7.76E-04 0.00E+00 4.84E-02 6.36E-06 8.50E-06 0.00E+00 5.33E-04 
RT->R 1.51E-04 4.03E-04 0.00E+00 2.51E-02 8.16E-04 5.42E-04 0.00E+00 3.44E-02 
ST->S 5.13E-02 2.98E-02 0.00E+00 1.90E+00 1.21E-03 6.90E-04 0.00E+00 4.40E-02 
ET->E 5.64E-02 3.25E-02 0.00E+00 2.07E+00 3.69E-06 6.37E-06 0.00E+00 3.98E-04 
ST->ET 9.21E-05 3.10E-04 0.00E+00 1.93E-02 3.00E-04 6.10E-04 0.00E+00 3.81E-02 
RT->ST 2.64E-04 5.46E-04 0.00E+00 3.41E-02 4.05E-04 6.91E-04 0.00E+00 4.33E-02 
IT->RT 3.48E-04 6.18E-04 0.00E+00 3.86E-02 1.38E-04 4.13E-04 0.00E+00 2.57E-02 
ET->IT 4.62E-05 2.17E-04 0.00E+00 1.35E-02 1.47E-04 2.67E-04 0.00E+00 1.67E-02 
ET->RT 4.75E-05 2.21E-04 0.00E+00 1.37E-02 5.87E-04 1.02E-03 0.00E+00 6.37E-02 
 
prevelance prevelance prevelance prevelance prevelance prevelance prevelance prevelance 
At First 
Month 0.001453 0.000763 0 0.04875 0.000402 0.000901 0 0.05623 
Over First 
Month 0.001244 0.001688 0 0.1059 0.000207 0.001854 0 0.1151 
At First Year 0.02449 0.0157 0 0.9973 0.0062 0.006526 0 0.4107 
Over First 
Year 0.008789 0.005328 0 0.339 0.002378 0.002122 0 0.1339 
Over 12 
Years 0.09484 0.005328 0 0.425 0.002378 0.002122 0 0.1339 
 
vaccination vaccination vaccination vaccination vaccination vaccination vaccination vaccination 
First 
Imposition 89.97 18.19 78.08 101.9 117.4 28.78 115.6 119.1 
First 
Withdrawal 410.6 63.19 369.3 451.8 277.8 31.39 275.9 279.8 
First 
Duration 77890 77890 0 230500 280 280 0 828.9 
 
incidence incidence incidence incidence incidence incidence incidence incidence 






Prior to Vac 0.005244 0.000957 0.005184 0.005303 0.006412 0.00121 0.006336 0.006487 
Over Month 
Post Vac 0.005742 0.001222 0.005666 0.005818 0.007033 0.001381 0.006947 0.007119 
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Appendix L: WHO Control Policies for Ebola 
1. Reduce risk of hospitalized transmission 
Health care workers to be given first priority on vaccination  
Mass screen-and-treat 
Protocol of protective equipment 
Quarantine of Suspected, Probable, and Confirmed cases 
2. Reduce risk of public transmission 
Contact tracing- whereby all interactions of Suspected, Probable, and Confirmed cases (in 
order of increasing necessity) are investigated and quarantined in suspected cases  
3. Reduce risk of wildlife to human transmission 
All raw meat thoroughly cooked 
Protective equipment (gloves) when dealing with suspected animal meat 
4. Containment 
Quarantine of all Suspected, Probably and Confirmed cases 
Prompt and safe Burial 
Monitoring those in contact with individual for 21 days 
Stochastic Averages of ABM



































Stochastic Averages of ABM Treatment Class



































Stochastic Averages of DEM



































Stochastic Averages of DEM Treatment Class





































5. Reduction in fatality 
Intravenous therapy (injection of fluids) 
Oral hydration 
 
Sources: Chan, 2014. Lashley and Durham, 2007. WHO {2}, 2014. WHO {3}, 2014. 
 
Appendix M: M3 Additional Models 
Comparison of Susceptible; Exposed; Infected; Dead-- (infectious); Dead++ (non-infectious) 
In a Differential Equation Model 
 
Without explicit compensation for spatial dynamics 
 
 
With explicit compensation for spatial dynamics 
 
 
In an Agent Based Model 
 








Comparison of Exposed with treatment; Infected with treatment; Recovered with treatment; Recovered 
In a Differential Equation Model 
 






With explicit compensation for spatial dynamics  
 
 
In an Agent Based Model 
 




With explicit compensation for spatial dynamics  
 
 
 
 
